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 7 
Standfirst: As robot swarms move from the laboratory to real world applications, a routine 8 
checklist of questions could help ensure their safe operation.  9 
 10 
Robot swarms promise to tackle problems ranging from food production and natural 11 
disaster response, to logistics and space exploration1–4. As swarms are deployed outside the 12 
laboratory in real world applications, we have a unique opportunity to engineer them to be 13 
safe from the get-go. Safe for the public, safe for the environment, and indeed, safe for 14 
themselves. This will help build public confidence in their use, and counter hyped or 15 
negative narratives about swarms in media and science fiction. Designing safe swarms is 16 
also challenging, as the main benefits of swarms, namely their scalability, robustness, and 17 
emergent properties, arise from self-organisation, a concept rarely used in engineering5.  18 
 19 
Previous research has identified certain challenges for the deployment of safe robot 20 
swarms, particularly in the areas of swarm agent fault tolerance6-9, human-swarm 21 
interaction8 and swarm security11–15, but limited consideration has been given to systematic 22 
assessment of swarm safety. As a starting point, we propose a preliminary “safe swarm 23 
checklist” with 10 questions that should be answered satisfactorily by engineers before a 24 
swarm can be deployed in the real world, where real costs are at stake. Highlighting 25 
potential risks early in the swarm design phase will allow mitigations to be introduced.  26 
 27 
Safety in engineering can be defined as the absence of catastrophic consequences on the 28 
user(s) and the environment. It is closely related to concepts of dependability, or the ability 29 
to deliver a service that can justifiably be trusted16. We take a holistic view of safety that 30 
goes beyond analysing failure modes and performing risk analysis17, to also include the 31 
broader socio-technical context of deployment. In our proposed “safe swarm checklist”, 32 
questions 1 and 2 on ethics and legality come first as a vital prerequisite for initial testing. 33 
Ethical governance and training should be pervasive from the design to the deployment of 34 
robot swarms18. Questions 3 and 4 relate to accountability and user-swarm interactions. 35 
Then, because a defining feature of swarms is their emergent capabilities, we consider 36 
individual and swarm-level risks separately for each of the dimensions of physical harm, 37 
behavioural harm, and security in questions 5 to 10.  38 
 39 
We briefly apply our checklist to a hypothetical swarm of 100 small floating robots – let’s 40 
call them bubblebots – deployed to monitor water pollutants (Figure 1). The idea builds on 41 
several examples of real-world robot swarm deployments in aquatic environments19–21. The 42 
bubblebots are meant to distribute over an enclosed floating harbour and light up in ways 43 
that communicate their local sensor readings. By sharing information within the swarm, the 44 
robots can collectively communicate the overall state of the water in the harbour and 45 





Figure 1 Safety considerations for the deployment of bubblebots used in a floating harbour 50 
to signal pollutants. 51 
 52 
(1) Ethics. Is this an ethical use of a robot swarm?  53 
 54 
We will consult authorities such as the IEEE Global Initiative on Ethics of Autonomous and 55 
Intelligent Systems and its work on Ethically Aligned Design22, or the BSI standard for Ethical 56 
Design and Application of Robots and Robotic Systems23. With bubblebots, we focus on an  57 
application for social good, namely environmental monitoring of water pollutants, 58 
considering privacy and potential harm to actors in the harbour. Mutual shaping of the 59 
technology between researchers and users will help embed local ethical norms24. 60 
 61 
(2) Legal. Does the swarm comply with all relevant laws and regulations for the 62 
domain(s) of deployment? 63 
 64 
The bubblebot swarm will need to comply with all relevant rules: environmental, harbour 65 
and maritime, or relating to health and safety. There may be a need for public liability 66 
insurance. 67 
 68 
(3) Accountability. Is there a way to analyse swarm failures? 69 
 70 
Following work by Winfield et al.25, it would be helpful to store short-term recordings of the 71 
actions of the robots based on sensory readings and communication in a so-called “black 72 
box”, inspired from flight recorders in the aviation industry. This could be done on board the 73 
robots, or using an external camera system monitoring overall operations. This information 74 
would help to investigate and reconstruct conditions that led to unsafe operations, and 75 
would be used to improve swarm implementation if things go wrong. 76 
 77 
(4) User interaction. Can the users interact with the swarm to prevent unwanted 78 
behaviour?  79 
 3
 80 
It should be possible to easily deploy, interact with and retrieve the swarm. In this case, user 81 
interaction will involve depositing the bubblebots in the harbour, and reading out the state 82 
of the swarm from the harbourside by looking at the robot location and colour status. 83 
Bubblebots can easily be stopped using a broadcasted message transmitted throughout the 84 
swarm from an operator on the harbourside, in which case robots will home to one area of 85 
the harbour for collection. 86 
 87 
(5) Physical harm from individual robots. Can the individual robots cause physical harm 88 
to humans, animals, or the environment? 89 
 90 
Bubblebots will be designed to be small enough to avoid damage to boats in the harbour, or 91 
other robots, but large enough to avoid seabirds and fish from eating them. Trials will be 92 
done to check that they are compatible with actors in the harbour. They will be buoyant to 93 
avoid them sinking and becoming a pollutant themselves, and will be easy to detect for 94 
collection by harbour staff. Materials for the waterproof shell will be optimised for 95 
durability to avoid breaches, and electronics will be low enough power to avoid possibility of 96 
electric shock. Bubblebots failing (power loss, broken sensor or motors) will turn off, 97 
avoiding further impact. In the future, bubblebots could even be biodegradable as an 98 
additional safeguard – such research is moving beyond the conceptual stage26.   99 
 100 
(6) Physical harm from the swarm. Can the emergent swarm behaviour cause physical 101 
harm to humans, animals, or the environment? 102 
 103 
The swarm of 100 bubblebots could disrupt natural animal behaviour in the harbour by 104 
being a source of distraction, changing their usual feeding habits. Studies will need to be 105 
done to assess the impact of the swarm on wildlife. Likewise, the swarm could cause 106 
damage to boats or the harbour if they all accumulate in the same location. Algorithmic 107 
safeguards will be put in place to avoid dense robot aggregation.  108 
 109 
(7) Behavioural harm from individual robots. Can the behaviour of individual robots 110 
result in unsafe operation? 111 
 112 
Poor programming or lack of consideration of noise in the environment (boats passing by, 113 
local disturbance of the sensor from wildlife) may lead individual robot behaviours to 114 
display erroneous or unreliable LED colours (constantly fluctuating, or inconsistent with 115 
neighbouring robots), which may result in these individual robots unnecessarily worrying 116 
the harbourside community and eroding trust in the overall operation of the swarm. 117 
Individual behaviours will be thoroughly tested to determine the parameters that lead to 118 
stable and reliable signal outputs, and, where possible, the programme will be formally 119 
verified to avoid undiscovered use cases25. Individual failures can also be detected and 120 
signalled by other members of the swarm as a way to make them more visible 6-9.                                               121 
 122 
(8) Behavioural harm from the swarm. Can failure of the emergent swarm behaviour 123 
cause unsafe operation?  124 
 125 
 4
Faulty swarm operation, either due to faulty individual robots impacting emergent swarm 126 
behaviour, or due to poor engineering of emergent properties, may result in incorrect water 127 
pollutant assessment. Consequently, pollution could go undetected or false alarms could 128 
lead to disruption of harbour operations. Mitigations could include an initial focus on 129 
detecting non-safety-critical pollutants that can be easily verified by a human on the 130 
ground. For safety critical pollutants, swarm behaviours will either need to be formally 131 
verified27, or tested thoroughly in simulation and reality to gain confidence in the system. A 132 
rigorous approval process could take inspiration from the approach used by other sectors, 133 
such as the FDA approval process for medicine.  134 
 135 
(9) Security of individual robots. Can individual robots be maliciously hacked?  136 
 137 
The minimal design of bubblebots will limit the ways in which they can be hacked, including 138 
hijacking communication channels, reprogramming the robot controller, or faulting the 139 
sensory readings. Securing these potential weaknesses will be a priority. A minimal design 140 
will also contribute to privacy, as relatively less information will need to be stored and/or 141 
processed onboard each robot. 142 
 143 
(10) Security of the swarm. Can the emergent swarm behaviour be subverted by 144 
malicious actors? 145 
 146 
Swarm behaviours could be subverted by injecting robots with faulty sensory readings into 147 
the swarm, or changing the environment, for example by inserting “fake pollutants”. A 148 
swarm signature will be added to all bubblebots to ensure they are able to detect internal, 149 
versus external actors. Additionally, swarms will aim to communicate unusual patterns in 150 
pollutants by displaying a collective “confidence” status using their colour (e.g. orange for 151 
unusual activities). One will also need to check whether swarm behaviour can reveal private 152 
information, for example through chemical detection near boats, or imaging of personal 153 
identifiers.  154 
 155 
While this is not meant to be an exhaustive assessment, it provides initial insight into the 156 
safety of the swarm. Redundancy in the questions asked, for example behavioural harm 157 
leading to physical harm due to poor testing of the harbour water, is intentional and allows 158 
for a thorough coverage of safety considerations from different perspectives. 159 
 160 
The checklist will identify different risks for different use case scenarios and swarm 161 
technologies. Consider applying the checklist to a swarm of robots designed to store and 162 
retrieve goods in a warehouse. Swarms can be used ethically in logistics, though amongst 163 
broad considerations we will assess their impact on human labour. The swarm will need to 164 
comply with regulations in place regarding workplace safety. The user interaction part of the 165 
checklist will consider workers in nearby proximity of the swarm unloading or requesting 166 
items, those passing by on the shop floor, and supervisors monitoring and controlling the 167 
swarm. Such a supervisory system could also allow for short-term recording of the 168 
warehouse state, to be used as a black box for accountability if anything goes wrong, or 169 
individual robots could locally store a log file for analysis. In relation to physical harm, 170 
robots working in densely populated environments with workers, goods, and other robots 171 
will need to avoid collisions. Hardware should be designed to be robust to failure, for 172 
 5
example detecting sensor or motor malfunction, or battery faults which could cause 173 
damage or fires. Collectively, we will need to demonstrate the swarm is able to perform its 174 
task without causing physical harm, for example transporting items, without toppling over. 175 
To assess behavioural harm, we will consider whether individual robots thoroughly map all 176 
possible sensory readings to appropriate actions (e.g. avoiding dangerous full speed motion 177 
for example), we will also study the behaviour of the swarm to ensure they don’t cause 178 
unsafe configurations in the warehouse by blocking exit routes. Security in this scenario 179 
might relate to industrial espionage, whereby competitors wish to gain business intelligence 180 
about what products are being handled; robots could work effectively without needing to 181 
identify the contents of their load. Hackers may also aim to disrupt operations, which would 182 
necessitate safeguards to avoid external actors from interacting with the swarm.  183 
 184 
Using our checklist, we have begun systematic, albeit theoretical, exploration of safe robot 185 
swarm designs for real-world deployment. Designing such swarms is most likely feasible 186 
with today’s technology and making them thoroughly safe will improve public perceptions 187 
in the crucial early trust building stage.  188 
 189 
Safe swarms can take many forms, depending on the capabilities of the robots and numbers 190 
used. Robots such as bubblebots rely on their simplicity, making them less likely to 191 
individually fail in complex ways; less liable to subtle manipulation; and more likely to 192 
biodegrade quickly and harmlessly. More capable warehouse robots may instead rely on 193 
classical cybersecurity tools and reasoning to make them individually safe. In both cases, 194 
swarms should benefit from the philosophy of ‘complexity engineering’, where we rely on 195 
emergence of collective capabilities to get the task done. This puts the focus on getting 196 
interactions right, whether within the swarm, with other robot systems or human users, and 197 
with the physical world. 198 
 199 
The potential for robot swarms to improve our world is enormous: first though, we must 200 
build in safety from the beginning. Safe swarms are successful swarms.   201 
 202 
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